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The carrying  capacity  of our natural  environment  fraction as the developing  world.
is an important  unpriced  input to production.  A  Slade  finds that increased  revenue  resources
consensus  is growing  that users  should  pay for  will more  than compensate  the average  develop-
the environmental  damage  that they  cause.  ing country  for the costs of pollution  control, so
Although  most people can accept  this policy in  no assistance  or intervention  would  be required.
principle,  many are concerned  with the magni-  This assumes,  however,  that capital  markets  are
tude and incidence  of its associated  costs and the  perfect,  which is far from the case  in many
disruptions  that would  be created  during a  developing  countries.  These  imperfections
transition  period.  Of particular  concern  is the  constitute  the greatest  obstacle  to successful
burden that might be placed on the economies  of  environmental  regulation.
developing  countries.  When  the industrial  world  Loans or subsidies  from North to South
was developing,  it was able to benefit  from  should  be considered,  says Slade.  Developing
cheap  natural-resource  commodities.  Is it fair to  country  producers  should  be given access  to
expect countries  that are trying  to imitate this  credit in dollars,  prices  of imported  pollution-
pattern to pay more?  abatement  equipment  could be reduced,  or aid
Unfortunately  there are not reliable  estimates  could  be tied to the installation  and maintenance
of the effects of environmental  protection  costs  of environmental  capital.
on production,  consumption,  revenues,  and  Slade finds  that environmental  protection
foreign  exchange.  Slade  explores  these issues  for  costs  are small. Compliance  costs of roughly
the energy  and nonfuel-mineral  markets,  sectors  three  percent  of product  prices  lead to changes  in
responsible  for much of current  industrial  export  revenues  of less than one percent The
pollution.  principal  reason  for this result  is that mineral
Using a model,  she examines  the conse-  commodity  demand  and supply are inelastic  in
quences  of the developing  world adopting  the  the long run.
environmental  standards  of the industrialized  As for the incidence  of environmental  costs,
world.  She assumes:  all producers  incur  clean-up  an environmental  "tax" is on average  progres-
costs; most adjustment  is made  through  changes  sive, because  low-income  countries  are typically
in prices  and quantities,  not through  altered  trade  net exporters  of mineral  commodities,  whereas
patterns;  and the industrialized  world  increases  high-income  countries  are  net importers.
its environmental  expenditures  by the same
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The carrying capacity of our natural environment is an important unpriced input to
production.  However, a consensus is growing that users should pay for the environmental
damage that they cause.  Although most people can accept this policy in principle, many are
concerned  with the magnitude  and incidence  of its associated  costs and the disruptions  that would
be created during a transition period.  Of particular concern is the burden that might be placed
on the economies  of developing  countries. When the industrialized  world was developing,  it was
able to  benefit from cheap natural-resource  commodities.  Is it  therefore unfair to expect
countries that are attempting  to imitate this pattern to pay more?
Unfortunately,  we lack reliable estimates  of the effects of environmental-protection  costs
on production, consumption,  revenues, and foreign exchange. This paper explores these issues
for the energy and nonfuel-mineral  markets,' sectors that are responsible for a large element
of currently generated industrial pollution. 2
Unlike previous assessments, which look at unilateral adoption  of standards and assess
implications  for the adopting  country only 3, I assume that all producers incur clean-up costs.
This means that most of the adjustment  is accomplished  through  changes  in prices and quantities
rather than through changes in trade patterns.  No new elasticities of supply and demand or
environmental-protection  costs  for  natural-resource commodities are  estimated.  Instead,
information  is gleaned from existing estimates,  and used in a systematic  fashion.
Background
Although  environmental  protection was a major concern in the 1970s, in the 1980s the
interest of both private and public groups seemed to wane.  However, and concern is again
growing. Indeed, it is likely that environmental  degradation  will be a major public issue of the
1990s.
Pollution  control in the U.S. provides  one illustration  of this pattem.  In 1965, the Clean
Air Act set national automobile-emissions  standards  for the first time.  Other major legislation
I  The word  mineral  denotes any  substance  that occurs  naturally  in the Earth's crust and is
extracted  for Man's use. In this paper, we consider  only mineral  fuels and ferrous and nonferrous
metals.
2  For example,  Jorgenson  and Wilcoxen  (1990)  find that the petroleum  refining,  primary
metals,  and chemicals  sectors  account  for over 55 percent of U.S. spending  on
pollution-abatement  equipment.
3  Examples  include  Walter 1971,  den Hartog and Houweling  1976,  Mutti and Richardson
1976  and 1977,  Hollenback  1979, Pasurka 1984,  Robison 1988,  and Tobey 1990.
1was passed  ir. the late 60s and early 70s. 4 These early acts contain most of the guidelines  under
which U.S.  environmental policy is  conducted today.  Under their mandate, firms incur
substantial  expenditures on environmental  protection.  When conservative politicians gained
contr-l of the government in the early 1980s, however, they began to question the efficacy of
enviionmental  legislation  and to wonder if the burden was excessive. For example, in his 1981
State of the Union Address, President  Reagan noted that 'we have no intention  of dismantling
the regulatory  agencies,  especially  th-se necessary  to protect  the environment....  However,  we
must come  to grips with inefficient  _.nd  burdensome  regulations  -- eliminate  those  we can and
reform  the others.  "n As a consequence,  no major new legislation was passed for a decade.
Today,  there  is  considerable evidence of  a  rebirth  of  worldwide concern  with
environmental degradation.  For  example, the European Association of Environmental and
Resource  Economists  was created in 1990; its North American  counterpart was founded  in the
70s.  The culmination  of this new awareness  is the United Nations Conference on the Global
Environment  and Development,  perhaps  the largest international  congress  ever. Although  at the
time ef writing it remains unclear what the precise results of UNCED will be, it seems  at least
possible that some form of international-environmental  agreement may eventually  be reached.
This paper aims to assess some of the consequences of such an agreement, and in
particular, its potential effect on the incomes and outplt of .ess developed countries.  Many
nonindustrial  economies  are still highly  dependent  on exports of primary commodities  as sources
of foreign revenue. UNCTAD  (1991)  estimates  this dependence  at 70 percent or more for those
countries recognized as least developed.  For this reason, changes in net-export revenues by
income class and geographic  re-gion  are assessed in this paper. 6
Organization  of the Paper
The next section deals with the magnitude  and incidence  of environmental-compliance
costs and their consequences  for developing  countries, both net producers and net consumers.
A simple partial-equilibrium  competitive-market  model is used for this purpose.  As the model
is very simple, it is not apt to be highly accurate.  I therefore adopt a pessimistic  approach; in
other words, when a choice must be made, a high-cost/low-adjustment  alternative  is selected.
In this way, I hope to come up with an upper bound on potential  disruptions.
The data are of two kinds.  First, a data bank of previous estimates of elasticities of
4  These include  the Air Quality  Act of 1967,  the National  Environmental  Policy  Act of
1969,  the Federal Water Pollution  Control  Amendments  of 1972,  the Toxic  Substances  Control
Act of 1976,  the amendments  to the Solid  Waste  Disposal  Act of 1976,  and the Clean Water Act
of 1977.
5  This  quote is taken from Pasurka  (1984).
6  Net-export  revenues  will  of course  be negative  for net-importing  counties.
2supply and  demand, and  environmental-compliance  costs  for  particular  commodities, is
compiled. These data are used to estimate worldwide  changes in production and consumption
of specific fuel and nonfuel-mineral  commodities. Second, detailed data on population, GNP,
and mineral production and consumption  by country, are used to attribute worldwide  changes
in production and consumption  to specific  regions and income groups.
A final section  summarizes  and concludi . To anticipate  results, the estimated  magnitude
of worldwide  changes  is not large.  Contrary  to popular  belief, many  poor countries may benefit
from international  environmental  regulation. Nevertheless,  disruptions  could  be severe for some
countries, especially  in the short-term.
II. The Magnitude and Incidence of Compliance Costs
1 The Assumptions
All models rely on a set of simplifying  assumptions whose realism is suspect.  It is
therefore important to make these assumptions  transparent so that readers can form their own
judgements as to the validity of the exercise.
First, I assume that  producers  incur all environmental  compliance  costs (hereafter  ECC).
In 1972, the OECD agreed to a polluter-pays  principle under which the full cost is born by the
user.  From an economic  point of view, this is the only sensible  policy.  Environmental  costs
are real costs and, just like wages, should  be paid by the producer. Nevertheless,  other schemes
have been suggested.  For example, Mutti and Richardson (1977) compare the polluter-pays
principle to a scheme where costs are fully subsidized  and the subsidy is financed through a
uniform-value-added  tax.  The presumed advantage  of the second scheme is that the burden of
compliance is borne equally by all  sectors.  However, this is precisely its disadvantage.
Competitive  markets allocate resources efficiently  only if full marginal costs are paid by each
producer.  For this reason, a polluter-pays  principle is adopted here.
Second, I assume that all markets are competitive  and that, with the exception  of ECC,
all costs are fully and accurately accounted for.  These assumptions, which are  made for
tractability, may not be realistic.  Imperfections  in input and output markets are discussed by
Slade (199la), who concludes that, at least in developing  countries, factor-market  distortions
such as  unemployment  and capital constraints are potentially large.  In particular, in  less
developed  countries  there are often systematic  forces that cause the shadow  price of labor to be
less than the market wage. 7 On the other hand, if the domestic currency is overvalued, the
social-opportunity  cost of imported capital  exceeds the official  financial  cost. Thus, capital and
labor-market distortions tend to offset each other, thereby mitigating the effect of either in
isolation. Monopoly  power, in contrast, is apt to be of less concern. This is true because most
mineral  commodities  are sold in world markets so that local producers have little price power.
Moreover, there are few mineral markets remaining where the number of producers is very
small.
7 For a discussion  of these issues,  see Little and Mirrlees  (1974).
3Third, the analysis is partial-equilibrium  in nature.  A general-equilibrium  approach
might be preferable.  There are,  however, at least two defenses of the partial approach in
addition to its simplicity. First, although  in theory Marshalian demand curves hold all other
prices constant, in practice econometric  estimates  of demand  typically  include only prices of the
most important  substitutes. This means that some general-equilibrium  responses  are embodied
in  the  estimated  long-run  elasticities.  Second,  when  models  are  constructed  with
general-equilibrium  refinements,  estimated  displacement  costs are lower than those produced  by
partial-equilibrium  models  (Mutti and Richardson, 1977). In other words, feedback  from other
sectors tends to mitigate  the impact  of ECC.  My estimates  therefore err on the high side. 8
Fourth, the analysis deals only with the private costs of protection.  If this were a
cost-benefit  study, I would attempt to estimate social costs. 9 The object, however, is to forecast
changes in resource revenues with an emphasis  on net exports. Given that prices and quantities
are determined  in markets, only costs that are actually incurred matter for the purposes of this
analysis.  Moreover, the analysis  is strictly positive; I do not consider the welfare implications
of the changes that are forecast.
Fifth, I assume that ECC are uniform across regions and that trade patterns remain
unaffected by compliance.  Given the first part of this assumption, the second is not overly
unrealistic. Even when unilateral standards are assessed, only small changes in trade pa.terns
are found (see Dean, 1991, for a summary).  Equalizing  abatement  costs, however, has been
criticized on the grounds that it fails to take account of the reallocation  of pollution-intensive
industries  to regions with large environmental  endowments  (Pearson 1987). A counter argument
is that changes in trade patterns resulting from nonuniform  standards are, in fact, small.
Finally, I have been unable to find ECC data for countries  other than the United States.
The pattern of expenses  is therefore assumed  to be similar in other regions.
2. The Model
The model used to assess changes in production, consumption, and revenues is very
simple. When  compared to models  used to assess the greenhouse  effect, most of which are very
large dynamic-general-equilibrium  or  multi-sector-macro  models,'° this approach may seem
overly simplistic. Simplicity,  however, can be a virtue: all assumptions  are transparent  and the
model can be understood  by policy makers who are not academic  economists.
8  As is discussed  in subsection  llc, the estimates  of ECC used here include  both direct and
indirect  components. Moreover,  they  are constructed  under the assumption  of full-cost
passthrough. The estimated  ECC themselves  therefore  are upper bounds.
I  For a discussion  of the differences  12tween  social  and private  environmental  costs,  see
Hazilla  and Kopp (1990).
10  For a survey  of these models  see Hoeller,  Dean, and Nicolaisen  (1990).
4We begin with long-run demand and supply equations for world consumption (Q,) and
production (Q) of a commodity. These equations  are used to determine a world price.  Long-
run elasticities  are used, because it is the long-run  implications  of environmental  regulation  that
are of primary concern. The choice of aggregate  demand  and supply  equations, however, is not
so simple and deserves further comment.
Most mineral commodities  are fairly homogeneous  and are sold in world markets.  A
single-price  assumption  therefore seems reasonable. Nevertheless,  when disaggregate  demand
and supply equations are available, one must decide whether to construct world demand and
supply  by adding  up regional  demands  and supplies,  or by using aggregate  equations. The latter
alternative is selected for several reasons.  First, disaggregate  equations  are only available for
a few commodities,  and a symmetric treatment seems p;eferable.  Second, the data that are
available  for poorer regions are less reliable than data for industrial  economies. Last and most
important,  when several regional-elasticity  estimates  are available, the variation in estimates  for
a given region is at least as great as the variation across regions." 1 Furthermore, no consistent
pattern of high and low-elasticity  regions emerge from the estimates. Consequently,  even if the
estimated  elasticities  are accurate on average, it is unwise  to put much faith in a single number.
Assume that demand and supply equations  are linear in logarithms (constant  elasticity),
so that'2
Qd=  a P,  e<O  (1)
and
Q, =bPh,  h  > O  (2)
In (1) and (2), e and h are long-run  elasticities  of demand and supply  respectively.  Equations
(1) and (2) can be inverted to yield
P  =  a Ql/°,  a  [1/a]'",  (3)
and
P  =  MC =  b Q 1A¶,  b  [1/b]'h,  (4)
where MC stands for marginal cost.
If markets clear, (3) and (4) can be equated  and solved for Q as follows
'l  For example,  Fisher  et al. (1972)  find that the long-run  elasticity  of copper  supply  for
Zambia  is "fargreater"  (italics  theirs) than the short-run  elasticity,  whereas  Wagenhals  (1984)
finds  that the two  are statistically  indistinguishable.
12  Constant-elasticity  supply  (demand)  equations  are exact  if the aggregate  long-run
technology  of production  (use) is translog. In (1) and (2), the prices  of substitutes  and
complements,  which  are assumed  to be constant,  are included  in a and b.
5Qd=  a/b,  d :-1/e  + 1/h,  Q:=  Q. =  Qd  ()
or
Q*=  [a/b]I/d  (6)
In (6),  * denotes a long-run-equilibrium  value.  Finally, long-run-equilibrium  price can be
obtained from either (3) or (4) and (6) as
p*  =  al+ m bm,  m :=  1/de  (7)
Suppose  now that environmental  regulations  are implemented  that raise the marginal  cost
of producing  this commodity  by r percent.  The inverse-supply  equation (4) then becomes
P'  =  MC'  =  b(1  +  r) Q."h.  (8)
In the new equilibrium, prices and quantities  are
Q'*,=  [a/(b(l  +r))]I/d  =  Q*(l+r)-I/d  (9)
and
Ps*  al+ m b(±+r)-m  =  P*(l+r).m  (10)
Finally, revenues from the sale of the commodity  change from P*Q* to
P *Q'  =  P*Q*(l+r)<I+Td/d  (11)
Given  estimates  of long-run  world elasticities  of supply  and demand for a commodity  (e
and h) and estimates  of ECC for that commodity  (r), equations  (9)-(I 1) can be used to estimate
changes in world price, production,  consumption,  and revenues. Worldwide  changes are then
allocated  to different  countries  by means  of the assumption  that, since all marginal  costs (prices)
have increased  by the same amount, production  (consumption)  is reduced  in every region by the
same fraction. 13 In other words, if P,  and Qi,J are post-agreement  prices and quantities in
country i, where  j  =  s or d, then
P-  P'*  (12)
and
Q',=  (l+r)  IdQU  j  =  s,d  (13)
where Q,  is a pre-agreement  quantity in country i.
"  Regional elasticities, when available, are not used at this stage for the same reasons that
they were not used in calculating  P* and Q*.
63. The Data
Elasticities:
Table I  shows estimated long-run demand and  supply elasticities for  ferrous and
nonferrous  metals and energy. Entries marked "world"  are taken from aggregate  production  or
consumption equations; those marked "averages over regions" are aggregated from several
regional equations.  Models that pertain to a single country or region are not included.
From the metals' data, a consistent  picture emerges.  Perhaps the most striking fact is
that demands  and supplies  are inelastic  in the long run.  Elasticities  are greater than one for only
two entries.  Moreover, for no group does an average of the elasticities shown in the table
exceed one.  Also notable is the  fact that variation in  estimated elasticities for a  single
commodity  (eg., copper supply) is at least as great as variation across commodities. Finally,
variation in estimated  supply elasticities  is greater than variation in demand estimates.
Part E of Table  I shows  aggregate-energy-demand  elasticities. Most energy commodities
are valued for their thermal content. As a result, an energy  aggregate is more meaningful  than
a metal aggregate.  Moreover, the demand for individual  energy commodities  is more elastic
than is aggregate-energy  demand. The reason is that most of the substitution  that occurs when
a single  price changes, involves  switching  between  various types of energy.  However, we wish
to consider the situation where the prices of all energy commodities  increase simultaneously.
Aggregatc  elasticities  are therefore more apt to be accurate.
Somewhat  surprisingly, estimates of energy-demand  elasticities are less plentiful than
estimates for metals.  Even though whole books have been devoted to the subject of energy
demand, most of these consider only the U.S.  (Halvorsen 1978, Bohi 1981) or are  static
(Halvorsen 1978, Pindyck 1979).  Very few dynamic-econometric  studies of world-energy
demand have been made.  Therefore, although no single-country  or single-region  models are
considered, I include studies that assess many countries  or many models of the same country.
With respect to energy supply (Table I,  part F),  the situation is even worse.  Most
econometric  studies of energy supply treat exploration,  production, and refining separately  and
make no attempt to integrate  the various phases.  It is perhaps for this reason that it is difficult
to identify anything  that might be called an energy-supply  elasticity."4
The elasticities  that are used in the analysis  are contained  in Table II.  In general, I have
chosen  the group averages, suitably  rounded to avoid the appearance  of spurious  accuracy. The
one exception  is copper supply  -- the long-run supply  elasticity  obtained  by Fisher et al. (1972)
is so out of line with other estimates that I use a value t  at is only somewhat larger than an
average that excludes their study.
14 This should  not be regarded  as a complete  explanation.  After all, metal  production  also  has
several  phases,  yet many  metal-supply  elasticities  have  been estimated.
7TABLE 1:
ESTIMATED  ELASTICMES
IA: Nonferrous-Metal Long-Run Demand Elasticities
|Demand  l Com  modity  Period  Elaslicify  Source  Commenls
Aluminum  1965-77  -. 045  Hojman  (1981)  OECD
Copper  1950-67  -0.51  Fisher et al. (1972)  Average over consuming regions
oo  Tin  1955-75  -0.72  Chhabra  et al. (1978)  Average over regions and uses
Zinc  ?  -0.47  Behrman (1975)'  World
Average Nonferrous  -0.54
Found in Adams and Behrman (1978)IU:  Nonferrous-Metal  Long-Run Supply Elasticities
ISupplyl
Comnmodily  Period  Elasticity  Source  Comments
Aluminum  1965-77  0.07  Hojman (1981)  World
Bauxite  1965-77  0.45  Hoiman (1981)  World
?  OAO  Berhman  (1977)4*  World
Copper  1950-67  4.65  Fisher et al. (1972)  Average over producing regions
1953-68  1.10  Banks (1974)  Average over producing regions
?  0.10  Behrman  (1977)'*  World
?  . 7  0.87  Pobukadee (1980)1*  Average over producing regions
Tin  1955-75  0.90  Chhabra  el  al. (1978)  Average over producing regions
7  0.18  Behrman (1975)  World
Zinc  ?  0.08  Behrman (1975)  World
Average Nonferrous  0O8
Excluding Fisher et al.  0.46
*  Found in Adams and Behrman (1978)
* *  Found in Adams and Behrman (1982)IC: Ferrous-Metal  Long-Run  Demand Elasticities
I  . Demand  . Commodity  Period  Etasticily  Source  - Comments
Iron and Steel  ?  -0.81  Hashimoto (1979)  OECD
1961-84  -. 48  Priovolos (1987)  Average over consumning  regions
Average  Ferrous  -0.65
ID: Ferrous-Metal  Long-Run  Supply Elasticities
I  Supply Commodit  Period  Elasticity  Source  |Comments
Iron  and Ore  1961-84  0.24  Priovolos  (1987)  Average  over consuming  regions
?  030  Behrman (1977)01  World
Nickel  ?  0.91  Adams (1974)1  Average  over consuning regions
Average Ferrous  0.49
*  Found  in Adamils  and Fehrman  (1978)
* *  Found  in Adams  and Behrman  (1982)IE: Aggregate-Energy Long-Run Demand Elasticities
| Demand
Comn  modity  Period  - Elasticity  Source  Commenis
Aggregate Energy  Various  -0.36  Energy-Modeling  Average of elasticities from 17 US
Forum  (1980)  models
Cross section
bycountry  -0.85  Seale et al. (1991)  Averageover5t  countries
developed and developing
1970-85  -0.27  Ibrahim and Hurst  Average of elasticities for 6
(1989)  developing countries
Average  Energy  -0.49
IF: Aggregate-Energy Long-Run Supply Elasticities
I  I  ~~Supply
Commodity  Period  | Elasticily  |  _Source  |Comments
Aggregate Energy  7  0.2  -0.8  World Bank (1990)  Not cear  if this is an econometric
estimate
Average  Energy  0.5TABLE 11:
PARAMETERS  USED  IN TIS  STUDY
Demand  Supply Commodity  Elastici y  ElasticiIy  Comments
Nonferrous  Metals  -0.55  050  Supply average  excludes  Fisher et al. (1972)
Ferrous  Metals  -0.65  050
Aggregate  Energy  -0.50  0.50
Average  Over All Commodities  -0.57  050
EEC  per
Conmmodity  Dollar  of Output  (%)  Comments
Metals  2.7
Energy  3.7  Pe
Average  3.2Environmental  Compliance  Costs:
At least three agencies  have estimated  U.S. ECC: the Bureau  of the Census, the Bureau
of  Economic Analysis (both of  which are  within the  Department of  Commerce), and
McGraw-Hill Inc.  Survey methods used differ along several dimensions including unit of
analysis and  sample size.  For  example, the  Bureau of  the  Census surveys plants or
establishments, whereas the Bureau of  Economic Analysis and McGraw-Hill survey firms.
McGraw-Hill's sample is by far the smallest (approximately  350 compared to 20,000 for the
Census and 15,000 for the BEA).  Given these differences, it is not surprising that there are
differences in the estimates.  However, for most industries, these differences are not large.
More important, no one source is systematically  higher or lower than the other two.  I have
chosen to base my analysis on the estimates  produced  by the Bureau of the Census  because they
are more widely  employed in previous research. For example, Pasurka (1984), Robison (1985
and 1988), and Jorgenson  and Wilcoxen  (1990) all use Census data.
The raw data, which come from Pollution  Abatement Costs and &penditures (various
years) consist of operating  and maintenance  costs (operating  expenses, depreciation,  and interest
on loans).  These are the direct costs of environmental  regulation; they do not include indirect
costs that result from paying higher prices for inputs whose production is also subject to
regulation. Kopp and Portney (1981)  note two factors that might lead to an upward bias in the
Census  estimates of direct costs.  First, there is a sample-selection  bias; firms that respond to
a survey are likely to be those spending  considerable  amounts  on pollution  abatement. Second,
there is a joint-cost  problem. When  production  and abatement  costs are difficult to separate, the
temptation  is to err towards large pollution-control  expenditures. However, an upward bias in
ECC is consistent  with our pessimistic  approach.
I have chosen to use estimates  of ECC for 1977  because  it is perhaps the year of highest
relative expenditures  (ECC/GNP).  For example, the U.S. Council on Environmental  Quality
(1990) estimates that the ratio of ECC expenditures  (capital plus operating) to GNP was 2.0
percent in 1977. The same ratio fell to 1.8 percent in 1982 and remained  at that lower level in
1987. Pasurka (1984)  translates these dollar expenditures  into direct-abatement  costs per dollar
of output for various sectors.  For energy and metals, these percentages  are contained in the
column marked "Direct Cost" in Table III.  They average slightly more than 1.5 percent.
Indirect  costs, however,  are more significant. They arise because  other sectors must also
comply with environmental regulations.  Pasurka (1984) and  Robison (1985) have used
input-output  models of the U.S. economy  to estimate these indirect costs.  Their estimates  can
be found in the column marked "Direct  Plus Indirect  Cost." Estimated  total costs are on average
about 40 percent higher than direct costs.
The estimates  of total ECC made by the two authors are not directly comparable,  partly
because different levels of aggregation  were used.  In keeping with the pessimistic  approach, I
select  the largest entry in the "direct plus indirect"  column for each sector. In other words, 3.7
is used for the percent increase in the energy sector (r.) and 2.7 for ferrous and nonferrous
metals (rj).  These are shown in the second half of table II.
There are several additional reasons why these might overestimate true ECC.  Two
reasons relate to  the input-output structure of  the models used to  obtain them.  With an
input-output  model, all cost increases are passed on in the form of higher prices.  In other
words, markets are assumed to be competitive  and supply elasticities  to be infinite.  In
13TABLE III:
1977  ENVIRONMENTAL-COMPLIANCE  COSTS PER $ OF OUTPUT (%r
Direct  Direct and Indirect Sector  |Cost  |Cost  Source
Ferrous and Nonferrous-Metal and Coal  1.94  2.67  Pasurka  (1984) Mirdng
Petroleum  and  Natural  Gas,  All Stages  221  3.69  Pasurka  (1984)
Iron-Ore  Mining  059  Robison  (1985)
Petroleum Refining  134  Robison (1985)
Ferrous-Metal  Refining  1.29  235  Pasurka  (1984)
Nonferrous-Melal Refining  0.73  2.00  Pasurka  (1984)
Iron  and  Steel  Refining  2.17  Robison  (1985)
Copper  Refining  2A0  Robison  (1985)
Nonferrous  Refining, Other  than  Copper  1  Robison (1985)
Average  1.54  2.12addition, the production function that underlies  an input-output  model is of the fixed-coefficient
variety.  This means that substitution  does not occur in response to changes in relative prices.
A third reason for overestimation,  in contrast,  arises from the sectoral  focus of our study.
The Census data include all expenditures  to eliminate air,  water, and solid-waste  pollution.
Since we are concerned  only with indirect costs due to pollution abatement  in the energy and
metals sectors, our estimates  might be substantially  exaggerated. However, this does not seem
likely.  Jorgenson and Wilcoxen  (1990), for example, find that only one sector, namely motor
vehicles, is hit as hard by environmental  regulations  as primary metals and energy.
Production and Consumption:
The World Bank collects data on GNP, population,  and production and consumption  of
the principal fuel and nonfuel-mineral  commodities  for nearly 200 countries."  Countries are
classified  by geographic  region and income level." 6 These data are used to attribute worldwide
changes in output and revenues of mineral commodities to geographic regions and income
groups.  First, however, a preliminary  analysis is useful.
Table IV provides summary statistics for 1987 by income class." 7 The low-income
group of countries is the largest with 2.8 billion people.  The middle-income  group has 1.4
billion, and the high group is the smallest  with 0.8 billion. GNP per capita ranges from $15,829
for the highest  class to $285 for the lowest. (Note that the income of the middle  group is much
closer to that of the low group than it is  to  the high.)  Finally, each group's per-capita
consumption  of nonferrous metals, steel, and energy differ sharply.
The  second part  of  Table IV  contains figures on  net  supply (production minus
consumption)  of individual  commodities  and commodity  aggregates  by income  group. Although
net supply cannot be equated with net exports, for storable commodities  such as metals, these
numbers are reasonable proxies for the numerical difference of exports and imports." 8 The
table shows that middle-income  countries are net producers of both nonferrous metals and
energy, whereas high-income countries are  neri consumers.  In  contrast, net  supplies for
low-income  countries are not large.  The situation  is very different, however, with respect to
steel;  here,  high-income countries are  net  producers and  low-income countries are  net
consumers.
Table V contains the same summary  statistics. In this table, however, instead of income
groups, countries are organized into eight geographic  regions.  North America and Western
1  Not all data are available  for every  country.
16 Detailed  documentation  for these data can be found in World  Tables  (1990).
17  1987  was chosen  as the base year  because  it is the most recent year for which  the data are
complete.
to  For the same reason,  net supplies  do not sum to zero.
15TABLE  IV:
SUMMARY  STATISTICS BY  INCOME CLASS,  1987
IVA:  GNP and Per-Capita  Consumption
Low-income  Medium-Income  High-income  | Variable  Group  Group  Group  Unils GNP  804  1,772  12,648  109  US S (1980)
Population  2.823  1374  0.799  109 people
GNP per capita  285  1,290  15,829  $
Per-Capita  Consumption  of
tons oil eauiv. Encrgy  314  2,018  4,988  103  people
Steel  34,217  221,013  402,834  tons/ 106  people
Nonferrous Metals  977  8,598  3C,355  nWIB:  Production Minus Consumption
Low-Incomne  Medium-income  High-Income  Variable  Group  Group  Group  Units
Aluminum  151  899  -1,105  103  Ions
Copper  570  1,204  -1,931
Lead  -51  -31  -9
Tin  35  47  -100
Zinc  -118  178  45
Total Nonferrous  587  2296  -3101
Steel  -24,014  4,498  27,790
Electrcity  0.6  -0.4  1.0  106  tons oil equiv.
Uiquid  Fuels  85  477  -527
Nalural Gas  25  51  -68
Solid Fuels  4  24  -15
Total Energy  106  551  -608TABLE V:
SUMMARY  STATISTICS BY  GEOGRAPHIC REGION, 1987
VA: GNP and Per-Capita Consumption"
North  Lalin  Western  Eastern  | Middle  Sub-  Asia  Pacific Variable  America  America  Europe  Europe  East/N.  Sahara
Africa  Africa GNP  4.93  0.72  4.99  024  050  0.22  1.07  256
Population  0.27  0.42  0.44  0.41  0.22  048  239  036
GNP per capita  18,286  1,710  11,226  2,247  2,265  455  447  7,029
00  Per-Capita  Consumption
Enegy  77.5  9.9  30.8  45.5  12.6  2.7  4A  12.4
Steel  42.6  7.9  28.6  52.9  6.7  23  5.2  225
Nonferrous Metals  3.7  05  2.2  1.8  0.2  0.08  0.2  1.2
a  Units ate the same as in table IVA.
b  Excludes Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.VB:  Production Minus Consumptiona
North  Latin  Western  Eastern  Middle  Sub-  Asia  Pacific Variable  America  America  Europe  Europe  EastIN.  Sahara __.  I=Africa  Africa
Aluminurn  -80.7  4,067  -562.8  490.8  249.8  2563  236.6  -1,324
Copper  -306.1  934.0  -1,444  224.7  23.2  796.0  -150.5  -235.9
Lead  -44.0  993  -111.0  -52.7  -17.0  14.1  88.4  -693
Tin  -35.7  21.4  -31.9  -23.4  -05  1.6  585  -8.1
Zinc  -256.0  69.8  117.0  03  -27.0  70.3  281.7  -151.0
Total Nlonferrous  -722.5  5,191  -2,033  639.7  2285  1,138  514.7  -1,788
Steel  -19,065  6,901  27,801  5,933  -8,234  -1,256  -23,837  20,031
Electricity  -0.8  -3.8  -0.5  6.3  0.0  -0.07  -0.4  1.0
liquid  Fuels  -278.7  104.3  -379.6  118.2  616.6  61.9  -35.4  -173.5
Natural Gas  6.8  4.2  -47.6  27.7  19.4  02  5.1  -7.7
Solid Fuels  54.7  -2.5  -68.2  16.9  4.1  29.6  425  -63.9
Total Energy  -217.9  102.3  -495.9  169.1  631.9  91.6  11.8  -244.1
a  Units are the same as in table IVB.Europe are the wealthy, industrialized  areas.  The Pacific is mixed, containing industrialized
countries such as  Japan  as  well as  less  developed countries such  as  Indonesia.  The
middle-income  regions are Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East/North Africa.
The poorest areas are Asia and Sub-Sahara  Africa.
The table shows that GNP per-capita  ranges from $18,286 in North America to $455 in
Sub-Sahara  Africa and $447 in Asia, respectively. With one exception,  per-capita consumption
of metals and fuels is closely related to GNP per capita.  The exception is Eastern El rope,
which consumes more of all commodity  groups than its income level would predict.  In fact,
per-capita steel consumption  is actually higher in Eastern Europe than in North America.
The second part of table V shows  a similar  pattern to the one revealed  by the breakdown
by income classes -- wealthy regions are net consumers  of everything, middle-income  regions
are net producers, and poor regions produze nonferrous metals and energy, and import steel.
There are exceptions.  For example, Middle East/North Africa is a net consumer of steel
whereas  the Pacific countries  are net producers. More important,  although  the pattern is similar
to that shown  in Table  IV, the finer  geographic  detail allow us to identify  potential  problems  not
earlier apparent. Asia's heavy  dependence  on imported  steel, for instance, suggests  that it might
be hard hit by price increases.
4.  A Conoeptual  Experiment
The following  conceptual  experiment  can now  be conducted. Let the industrialized  world
be  called  "North.  "  North  is  assumed to  have  high  per-capita income and  moderate
environmental standards." 9 Less developed counies  ("South"), are assumed to have lower
incomes  and standards. We then ask what will happen  to resource production,  consumption,  and
revenue if South adopts the standards set by North while, at the same time, North increases  its
expenditures  by the same fraction as South.  That is to say, suppose that current ECC are r
percent of  total costs in  the North and zero in  the South.  We are  trying to  assess the
consequences  of new environmental  legislation  that causes  total (production  plus environmental)
costs in the energy and metals sectors of both regions to increase by  r percent.  Raising
everyone's costs means that standards  continue  to be more stringent  in the regions that are more
able to pay.
The model developed  earlier and the data just described can be used to perform this
experiment. After the numbers  contained  in table II are substituted  for the parameters, we apply
equations  (9)-(13)  to each commodity  and each geographic  region or ilicome  class.  The results
are contained  in table VI.
Several conclusions  can be drawn from this table.  First, the numbers are small. Price
changes  average  about 1.5 percent; the comparable  figure for quantities  is -0.8.  Moreover, with
19  We assume  that all "Northern"  countries  have the same  standards  as the U.S. Robison
(1988)  concludes  that Canadian  ECC are roughly  equivalent  to those in the U.S. Moreover,
Western Europe, which  is not a major  producer  of most mineral  commodities,  probably  has
moderate  standards. Assessing  current levels  of ECC for each region,  however,  is not important
as long as all countries  increase  expenditures  by the same  fraction.
20TABLE VI:
FORECAST  CHANCES
VIA: % Change in Price and Aggregate Production
Commodity  Price  Quantity
Nonferrous Metals  1.28  -070
Ferrous Metals  1.17  -0.75
Energy  1.83  -0.90
VIB:  %Change in Export Revenues
t  |  ~~~~~~~~By  Income  Class 
Low  Medium  o  High  l
1255  0.88  1498
By Region
North  Latin  Western  Eastern  Europe Middle  Sub-Sahara  Asia  Pacific America  America  Europe  East/North  Africa
____  ____  ___  A frica  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
-0.79  0.78  -1.03  0.83  0.93  0.88  -0.47  -1.11one exception, changes in export revenues are close to one percent in absolute value.  These
numbers seem insignificant,  when compared  to the year-to-year  fluctuations  metal and energy
markets frequently  experience. Petroleum  and tin prices, for example, both more than halved
between 1985 and 1986, and aluminum  prices nearly doubled between 1986 and 1988.20  Two
of these changes  were temporary  fluctuations,  but the tin price collapse  has endured. Moreover,
in the 1970s  energy prices experienced  large increases  that were sustained  for many years.
The second conclusion  is that an environmental  "tax" is on average progressive. Where
mineral-commodity  revenues increase in low and medium-income  countries by approximately
2.5 and one percent respectively,  in high-income  countries, in contrast, they decline by about
one percent. 21 Similarly, the three regions with highest income per capita, North America,
Western Europe, and the Pacific, increase  expenditures  on mineral  commodities,  whereas  in the
three middle-income  regions, higher prices more than compensate for sales reductions, and
export revenues  rise.  The fate of the poorest regions, however, is mixed. Net exports increase
in Sub-Sahara  Africa.  The Asian countries, in contrast, must spend more for the energy and
steel that they import.  Nevertheless,  their export revenues fall by only one half of one percent.
To check whether these conclusions  are strongly  dependent  on the period chosen for the
analysis, the same calculations  are performed for the years 1986 and 1988  also.  In addition, a
coarser geographic  breakdown  is assessed using 1987  data, and 1987 prices are replaced with
average prices for the 1986-1988  period.  Naturally, the numbers change.  These changes,
however, are  surprisingly small.  The findings are  therefore robust, and  the qualitative
predictions  survive the sensitivity  analysis.
The  situation seems quite  rosy.  Not  only  are  the  magnitudes associated with
environmental  protection small, but the burden of protection is bome by those who can best
afford to pay.  However, a word of caution is in order.  Environmental  regulation  could cause
hardship for some low-income  countries.  On average, increased energy and nonferrous-metal
revenues more than compensate  for the higher expenditures  that poor countries must incur for
purchases  of iron and steel. Unfortunately,  some low-income  countries are poorly endowed  with
every  sort of  mineral and  must buy all  of  their resource requirements at  higher prices.
Identifying individual countries that  are  most disadvantaged, however,  requires  a  finer
geographic  breakdown  of mineral production and consumption.'
5. The Initial Investment
Given that increased revenue resources  will more than compensate  the average LDC for
For an analysis  of metal-price  instability,  see Slade (1991b).
21  In all cases  where  revenues  are reduced,  they were negative  to begin  with. This  means
that "reduced  revenues"  means  spending  more for imports  rather than receiving  less for exports.
22  Data on production  and consumption  are missing  for many  of the poorer countries.
22the costs of pollution control, no assistance  or intervention  should be required.  This assumes,
however, that capital markets are perfect, which is far from the case in  many developing
countries.  These imperfections  constitute  perhaps the most substantial obstacle to successful
environmental  regulation.
In addition to increased marginal costs, considerable  fixed costs are involved. Because
the technology  is imported, these costs will be incurred in foreign  exchange. Unfortunately,  the
shadow  price of foreign exchange  can be extremely hig'l, especially  for countries experiencing
balance-of-payments  difficulties.
In light of the transboundary  externalities  involved, loans or subsidies from North to
South should be considered: LDC producers could be provided with access to credit in dollars,
prices of imported  pollution-abatement  equipment  could be reduced, or aid could be tied to the
installation  and maintenance  of environmental  capital. The design of optimal  credit and subsidy
schemes  is beyond the focus of this paper.  Nevertheless,  if environmental  agreements  are to be
successful,  it is a subject that merits serious consideration.
m.  Summara  and Conclusions
The model used here is very simple.  The conclusions  reached are probably valid in
terms  of  qualitative predictions and  relative  magnitudes.  As  good  point  estimates of
envir-nmental-compliance  costs and their ramifications,  they probablv are not.
The spirit of the conclusions  drawn might be trusted for several reasons.  First, the
pessimistic  approach necessitated  choosing high-cost, difficult-adjustment  scenarios.  Second,
the conclusions  reached are not sensitive to the period of analysis or to the exact geographic
breakdown of  the  regions.  Rather,  the most sensitive parameters in  the  model are  the
mineral-commodity  prices. 'This is true, not because small changes in prices lead to radical
differences  in estimates,  but because commodity  prices are infamously  volatile, both in relative
and absolute terms.  Large changes in relative-mineral-commodity  prices could therefore cause
some  countries  to switch  from net-exporting  to net-importing  positions. Nevertheless,  the seven
geographic  regions analyzed  are fairly large and consequently  not prone to sign reversals.
Our  two  main  findings  relate  to  the  magnitude,  and  the  incidence,  of
environmental-protection  costs.  We saw that the magnitudes  involved  are small.  Compliance
costs of roughly three percent of product prices lead to changes  in export revenues of less than
one percent.  The principal reason for this result is that both demands and supplies  of mineral
commodities  are inelastic in the long run.  Moreover, this empirical regularity shows up in
virtually every econometric-commodity  model examined.
With respect to incidence, we saw that  an environmental  "tax" is on average  progressive.
This is true because low-income  countries  are on average  net exporters  of mineral  commodities,
whereas high-income countries are net importers.  Our second finding, however, should be
interpreted with caution.  While it is true on average, it  is unlikely to  be true for every
low-income  country.  In fact, a program that is on average  progressive could lead to substantial
hardships for the mineral poor.
The conclusions  reached are therefore somewhat more optimistic than those of other
studies.  Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990), for example,  find ECC-related reductions in U.S.
23mineral industry output of  more than five percent.23  There  are  two reasons  why the
Jorgenson-Wilcoxen  simulated impacts are  much larger than those found here.  First,  they
analyze unilateral adoption of environmental regulations within the North-South paradigm;
polluting activities, such as metal refining, consequently  gravitate  towards regions that are less
stringently  controlled.  Second, the U.S. is a net importer of all major metals and most fuels.
The  inevitable consequence is  higher import  dependence, coupled with  larger  per-unit
expenditures  on imported-mineral  commodities.
Some of the assumptions  underlying the model may not be realistic.  For example, all
minerai industries  are assumed to be competitive. For this reason, regulation does not cause
profit rates to change.  To the extent that industries are imperfectly competitive, however,
resource rents will be generated  and environmental  controls will cause shifts  in these rents across
geographic  regions and income classes.
A full-employment  assumption  also underlies the model.  As a result, factors released
from mineral  industries  can find employment  in other sectors, and no deadweight  loss is created.
To the extent that unemployment  exists, however, the predicted reduction in output of mineral
commodities will exacerbate the situation.  Moreover, the opportunity value of the released
workers might be closer to zero than to the market wage.
A possible problem with the analysis arises because mineral production is a vertically
integrated process.  This leads to various anomalies.  For example, Western Europe is a net
producer of zinc, in spite of the fact that it mines little zinc ore.  Most of its zinc production
comes from custom smelters. In a similar  vein, Japan is a net producer of steel but mines little
iron ore.  Unfortunately, keeping track of imports and exports at every stage of production
requires better data than are available.
Finally, no attempt was made to evaluate the benefits of environmental regulation.
Nevertheless, given that the costs are not prohibitive, benefits would have to be comparably
small if they were not to outweigh the costs.
Suppose  that benefits do in fact exceed costs. Global  environmental  controls should  then
be adopted. Unfortunately,  this leads to a new set of difficult  economic  problems, including  the
issue of enforcement. Although  national  governments  have legal authority  to force firms within
their boundaries to  comply with environmental regulation, there is  no global agency with
comparable  powers.  The implication  is that, if environmental  legislation  is to be successful,  it
must be self-enforcing. In the terminology  of game theory, the desired  outcome -- compliance
-- must be a Nash equilibrium  of the regulation  game.  The trick is to choose the rules of the
game so that selfish  behavior  on the part of national  governments  coincides  with the cooperative
solution.  Design of such schemes, however, is the subject of future research.
'  These reductions  are due to historic  ECC. In other words,  costs increases  of the same
magnitude  as those that we examine.
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